DUI IS NOT A CRIME OF VIOLENCE: Leocal v. Ashcroft  543 U. S. ____ (2004) November 9, 2004.


A drunk driving accident is not a "crime of violence" allowing the
government to deport a permanent resident, the Supreme Court ruled in
Leocal v. Ashcroft   543 U. S. ____ (2004) November 9, 2004.

The court ruled unanimously in favor of Josue Leocal, a Florida man
challenging his deportation to Haiti in 2002 after pleading guilty to a
felony charge of drunk driving.

The 11th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the DUI offense was a
"crime of violence" under the immigration statute because he had caused
injury to others.

The Supreme Court disagreed. It said the plain meaning of the statute
suggests that the felony offense must require intent in causing harm -
not mere negligence as in Leocal's case - before immigrants are subject
to the drastic consequence of deportation.

REHNQUIST, C. J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.


Petitioner, a lawful permanent resident of the United States, pleaded
guilty to two counts of driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) and
causing serious bodily injury in an accident, in violation of Florida
law. While he was serving his prison sentence, the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) initiated removal proceedings pursuant to §
237(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), which permits
deportation of an alien convicted of "an aggravated felony." INA §
101(a)(43)(F) defines "aggravated felony" to include, inter alia, "a
crime of violence [as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 16] for which the term of
imprisonment [is] at least one year." Title 18 U.S.C. § 16(a), in turn,
defines "crime of violence" as "an offense that has as an element the
use . . . of physical force against the person or property of another,"
and § 16(b) defines it as "any other offense that is a felony and that,
by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against
the person or property of another may be used in the course of
committing the offense." An Immigration Judge and the Board of
Immigration Appeals (BIA) ordered petitioner's deportation, and the
Eleventh Circuit dismissed his petition for review, relying on its
precedent that a conviction under Florida's DUI statute is a crime of
violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16.

Held: State DUI offenses such as Florida's, which either do not have a
mens rea component or require only a showing of negligence in the
operation of a vehicle, are not crimes of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16.
Pp. 4-11.

(a) Section 16 requires this Court to look to the elements and nature of
the offense of conviction in determining whether petitioner's conviction
falls within its ambit. Florida's DUI statute, like similar statutes in
many States, requires proof of causation but not of any mental state;
and some other States appear to require only proof that a person acted
negligently in operating the vehicle. This Court's analysis begins with
§ 16's language. See Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 144, 133 L.
Ed. 2d 472, 116 S. Ct. 501. Particularly when interpreting a statute
featuring as elastic a word as "use," the Court construes language in
its context and in light of the terms surrounding it. See Smith v.
United States, 508 U.S. 223, 229, 124 L. Ed. 2d 138, 113 S. Ct. 2050.
Section 16(a)'s critical aspect is that a crime of violence involves the
"use . . . of physical force against" another's person or property. That
requires active employment. See Bailey, supra, 516 U.S. 137, at 145,
1333 L. Ed. 472, 116 S. Ct. 501. While one may, in theory, actively
employ something in an accidental manner, it is much less natural to say
that a person actively employs physical force against another by
accident. When interpreting a statute, words must be given their
"ordinary or natural" meaning, Smith, supra, 508 U.S. 223 at 228, 124 L.
Ed. 2d 138, 113 S. Ct. 2050, and § 16(a)'s key phrase most naturally
suggests a higher degree of intent than negligent or merely accidental
conduct. Petitioner's DUI offense therefore is not a crime of violence
under § 16(a). Pp. 4-8.

(b) Nor is it a crime of violence under § 16(b), which sweeps more
broadly than § 16(a), but does not thereby encompass all negligent
conduct, such as negligent operation of a vehicle. It simply covers
offenses that naturally involve a person acting in disregard of the risk
that physical force might be used against another in committing an
offense. The classic example is burglary, which, by nature, involves a
substantial risk that the burglar will use force against a victim in
completing the crime. Thus, § 16(b) contains the same formulation found
to be determinative in § 16(a): the use of physical force against
another's person or property. Accordingly, § 16(b)'s language must be
given an identical construction, requiring a higher mens rea than the
merely accidental or negligent conduct involved in a DUI offense. Pp.
8-9.

(c) The ordinary meaning of the term "crime of violence," which is what
this Court is ultimately determining, combined with § 16's emphasis on
the use of physical force against another (or the risk of having to use
such force in committing a crime), suggests a category of violent,
active crimes that cannot be said naturally to include DUI offenses.
This construction is reinforced by INA § 101(h), which includes as
alternative definitions of "serious criminal offense" a "crime of
violence, as defined in [§ 16]," § 101(h)(2), and a DUI-causing-injury
offense, § 101(h)(3). Interpreting § 16 to include DUI offenses would
leave § 101(h)(3) practically void of significance, in contravention of
the rule that effect should be given to every word of a statute whenever
possible, see Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174, 150 L. Ed. 2d 251,
121 S. Ct. 2120. Pp. 9-11.

(d) This case does not present the question whether an offense requiring
proof of the reckless use of force against another's person or property
qualifies as a crime of violence under § 16. P. 11.

Reversed and remanded.

Posted: Tue - November 9, 2004 at 01:40 PM        

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