INS v. St. Cyr: Supreme Court Allows Criminal Aliens to Apply for
Waivers under former Section 212(c)
Courts have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 2241 to
decide the
legal issue raised by St. Cyrs habeas petition. (2) Section 212(c)
relief remains available for aliens, like St. Cyr, whose convictions
were obtained through plea agreements and who, notwithstanding those
convictions, would have been eligible for 212(c) relief at the time of
their plea under the law then in effect. Certiorari to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit No. 00767. June 25, 2001
legal issue raised by St. Cyrs habeas petition. (2) Section 212(c)
relief remains available for aliens, like St. Cyr, whose convictions
were obtained through plea agreements and who, notwithstanding those
convictions, would have been eligible for 212(c) relief at the time of
their plea under the law then in effect. Certiorari to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit No. 00767. June 25, 2001
Before the effective dates of the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) and the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), 212(c) of the Immigration
and Nationality Act of 1952 was interpreted to give the Attorney General
broad discretion to waive deportation of resident aliens. As relevant
here, the large class of aliens depending on 212(c) relief was reduced
in 1996 by 401 of AEDPA, which identified a broad set of offenses for
which convictions would preclude such relief; and by IIRIRA, which
repealed 212(c) and replaced it with a new section excluding from the
class anyone convicted of an aggravated felony, 8 U.S.C. 1229b(a)(3).
Respondent St. Cyr, a lawful permanent United States resident, pleaded
guilty to a criminal charge that made him deportable. He would have been
eligible for a waiver of deportation under the immigration law in effect
when he was convicted, but his removal proceedings were commenced after
AEDPAs and IIRIRAs effective dates. The Attorney General claims that
those Acts withdrew his authority to grant St. Cyr a waiver. The Federal
District Court accepted St. Cyrs habeas corpus application and agreed
that the new restrictions do not apply to removal proceedings brought
against an alien who pleaded guilty to a deportable crime before their
enactment. The Second Circuit affirmed.
HTML version: http://supct.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/00-767.ZS.html
PDFversion: http://callyourlawyers.com/pdfcaselaw/St.Cyr_supct.pdf
Held:
1. Courts have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 2241 to decide the legal
issue raised by St. Cyrs habeas petition.
a) To prevail on its claim that AEDPA and IIRIRA stripped federal courts
of jurisdiction to decide a pure question of law, as in this case,
petitioner Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) must overcome
both the strong presumption in favor of judicial review of
administrative action and the longstanding rulerequiring a clear and
unambiguous statement of congressional intent to repeal habeas
jurisdiction. Here, that plain statement rule draws additional
reinforcement from other canons of statutory construction: First, when a
statutory interpretation invokes the outer limits ofCongress power,
there must be a clear indication that Congress intended that result; and
second, if an otherwise acceptable construction would raise serious
constitutional problems and an alternative interpretation is fairly
possible, the statute must be construed to avoid such problems.
b) Construing the amendments at issue to preclude court review of a pure
question of law would give rise to substantial constitutional questions.
The Constitutions Suspension Clause, which protects the privilege of the
habeas corpus writ, unquestionably requires some judicial intervention
in deportation cases. Heikkila v. Barber, 345 U.S. 229, 235. Even
assuming that the Clause protects only the writ as it existed in 1789,
substantial evidence supports St. Cyrs claim that pure questions of law
could have been answered in 1789 by a common-law judge with power to
issue the writ. Thus, a serious Suspension Clause issue would arise if
the 1996 statutes have withdrawn that power from federal judges and
provided no adequate substitute. The need to resolve such a serious and
difficult constitutional question and the desirability of avoiding that
necessity reinforce the reasons for requiring a clear and unambiguous
statement of constitutional intent. Pp. 914.
(c) To conclude that the writ is no longer available in this context
would also represent a marked departure from historical immigration law
practice. The writ has always been available to review the legality of
executive detention, see e.g., Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 663, and,
until the 1952 Act, a habeas action was the sole means of challenging a
deportation orders legality, see, e.g., Heikkila, 345 U.S., at 235.
Habeas courts have answered questions of law in alien suits challenging
Executive interpretations of immigration law and questions of law that
arose in the discretionary relief context. Pp. 1417.
(d) Neither AEDPA 401(e) nor three IIRIRA provisions, 8 U.S.C.
1252(a)(1), (a)(2)(C), and (b)(9), express a clear and unambiguous
statement of Congress intent to bar 28 U.S.C. 2241 petitions. None of
these sections even mentions 2241. Section 401(e)s repeal of a
subsection of the 1961 Act, which provided, inter alia, habeas relief
for an alien in custody pursuant to a deportation order, is not
sufficient to eliminate what the repealed section did not grantnamely,
habeas jurisdiction pursuant to 2241. See Ex parte Yerger, 8 Wall. 85,
105106. The three IIRIRA provisions do not speak with sufficient clarity
to bar habeas jurisdiction. They focus on judicial review or
jurisdiction to review. In the immigration context, however, judicial
review and habeas corpus have historically distinct meanings, with
habeas courts playing a far narrower role. Pp. 1724.
2. Section 212(c) relief remains available for aliens, like St. Cyr,
whose convictions were obtained through plea agreements and who,
notwithstanding those convictions, would have been eligible for 212(c)
relief at the time of their plea under the law then in effect. Pp. 2436.
(a) A statutes language must require that it be applied retroactively.
Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hospital, 488 U.S. 204, 208. The first step in
the impermissible-retroactive-effect determination is to ascertain
whether Congress has directed with the requisite clarity that the law be
applied retrospectively. Martin v. Hadix, 527 U.S. 343, 352. Such
clarity is not shown by the comprehensiveness of IIRIRAs revision of
federal immigration law, see Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S.
244, 260261, by the promulgation of IIRIRAs effective date, see id., at
257, or by IIRIRA 309(c)(1)s saving provision. Pp. 2430.
(b) The second step is to determine whether IIRIRA attaches new legal
consequences to events completed before its enactment, a judgment
informed and guided by considerations of fair notice, reasonable
reliance, and settled expectations. Landgraf, 511 U. S., at 270. IIRIRAs
elimination of 212(c) relief for people who entered into plea agreements
expecting that they would be eligible for such relief clearly attaches a
new disability to past transactions or considerations. Plea agreements
involve a quid pro quo between a criminal defendant and the government,
and there is little doubt that alien defendants considering whether to
enter into such agreements are acutely aware of their convictions
immigration consequences. The potential for unfairness to people like
St. Cyr is significant and manifest. Now that prosecutors have received
the benefit of plea agreements, facilitated by the aliens belief in
their continued eligibility for 212(c) relief, it would be contrary to
considerations of fair notice, reasonable reliance, and settled
expectations to hold that IIRIRA deprives them of any possibility of
such relief. The INS argument that application of deportation law can
never have retroactive effect because deportation proceedings are
inherently prospective is not particularly helpful in undertaking
Landgrafs analysis, and the fact that deportation is not punishment for
past crimes does not mean that the Court cannot consider an aliens
reasonable reliance on the continued availability of discretionary
relief from deportation when deciding the retroactive effect of
eliminating such relief. That 212(c) relief is discretionary does not
affect the propriety of this Courts conclusion, for there is a clear
difference between facing possible deportation and facing certain
deportation. Pp. 3036. 229 F.3d 406, affirmed.
Stevens, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Kennedy,
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined. OConnor, J., filed a
dissenting opinion. Scalia, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which
Rehnquist, C.J., and Thomas, J., joined, and in which OConnor, J.,
joined, as to Parts I and III.
Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) and the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), 212(c) of the Immigration
and Nationality Act of 1952 was interpreted to give the Attorney General
broad discretion to waive deportation of resident aliens. As relevant
here, the large class of aliens depending on 212(c) relief was reduced
in 1996 by 401 of AEDPA, which identified a broad set of offenses for
which convictions would preclude such relief; and by IIRIRA, which
repealed 212(c) and replaced it with a new section excluding from the
class anyone convicted of an aggravated felony, 8 U.S.C. 1229b(a)(3).
Respondent St. Cyr, a lawful permanent United States resident, pleaded
guilty to a criminal charge that made him deportable. He would have been
eligible for a waiver of deportation under the immigration law in effect
when he was convicted, but his removal proceedings were commenced after
AEDPAs and IIRIRAs effective dates. The Attorney General claims that
those Acts withdrew his authority to grant St. Cyr a waiver. The Federal
District Court accepted St. Cyrs habeas corpus application and agreed
that the new restrictions do not apply to removal proceedings brought
against an alien who pleaded guilty to a deportable crime before their
enactment. The Second Circuit affirmed.
HTML version: http://supct.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/00-767.ZS.html
PDFversion: http://callyourlawyers.com/pdfcaselaw/St.Cyr_supct.pdf
Held:
1. Courts have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 2241 to decide the legal
issue raised by St. Cyrs habeas petition.
a) To prevail on its claim that AEDPA and IIRIRA stripped federal courts
of jurisdiction to decide a pure question of law, as in this case,
petitioner Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) must overcome
both the strong presumption in favor of judicial review of
administrative action and the longstanding rulerequiring a clear and
unambiguous statement of congressional intent to repeal habeas
jurisdiction. Here, that plain statement rule draws additional
reinforcement from other canons of statutory construction: First, when a
statutory interpretation invokes the outer limits ofCongress power,
there must be a clear indication that Congress intended that result; and
second, if an otherwise acceptable construction would raise serious
constitutional problems and an alternative interpretation is fairly
possible, the statute must be construed to avoid such problems.
b) Construing the amendments at issue to preclude court review of a pure
question of law would give rise to substantial constitutional questions.
The Constitutions Suspension Clause, which protects the privilege of the
habeas corpus writ, unquestionably requires some judicial intervention
in deportation cases. Heikkila v. Barber, 345 U.S. 229, 235. Even
assuming that the Clause protects only the writ as it existed in 1789,
substantial evidence supports St. Cyrs claim that pure questions of law
could have been answered in 1789 by a common-law judge with power to
issue the writ. Thus, a serious Suspension Clause issue would arise if
the 1996 statutes have withdrawn that power from federal judges and
provided no adequate substitute. The need to resolve such a serious and
difficult constitutional question and the desirability of avoiding that
necessity reinforce the reasons for requiring a clear and unambiguous
statement of constitutional intent. Pp. 914.
(c) To conclude that the writ is no longer available in this context
would also represent a marked departure from historical immigration law
practice. The writ has always been available to review the legality of
executive detention, see e.g., Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 663, and,
until the 1952 Act, a habeas action was the sole means of challenging a
deportation orders legality, see, e.g., Heikkila, 345 U.S., at 235.
Habeas courts have answered questions of law in alien suits challenging
Executive interpretations of immigration law and questions of law that
arose in the discretionary relief context. Pp. 1417.
(d) Neither AEDPA 401(e) nor three IIRIRA provisions, 8 U.S.C.
1252(a)(1), (a)(2)(C), and (b)(9), express a clear and unambiguous
statement of Congress intent to bar 28 U.S.C. 2241 petitions. None of
these sections even mentions 2241. Section 401(e)s repeal of a
subsection of the 1961 Act, which provided, inter alia, habeas relief
for an alien in custody pursuant to a deportation order, is not
sufficient to eliminate what the repealed section did not grantnamely,
habeas jurisdiction pursuant to 2241. See Ex parte Yerger, 8 Wall. 85,
105106. The three IIRIRA provisions do not speak with sufficient clarity
to bar habeas jurisdiction. They focus on judicial review or
jurisdiction to review. In the immigration context, however, judicial
review and habeas corpus have historically distinct meanings, with
habeas courts playing a far narrower role. Pp. 1724.
2. Section 212(c) relief remains available for aliens, like St. Cyr,
whose convictions were obtained through plea agreements and who,
notwithstanding those convictions, would have been eligible for 212(c)
relief at the time of their plea under the law then in effect. Pp. 2436.
(a) A statutes language must require that it be applied retroactively.
Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hospital, 488 U.S. 204, 208. The first step in
the impermissible-retroactive-effect determination is to ascertain
whether Congress has directed with the requisite clarity that the law be
applied retrospectively. Martin v. Hadix, 527 U.S. 343, 352. Such
clarity is not shown by the comprehensiveness of IIRIRAs revision of
federal immigration law, see Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S.
244, 260261, by the promulgation of IIRIRAs effective date, see id., at
257, or by IIRIRA 309(c)(1)s saving provision. Pp. 2430.
(b) The second step is to determine whether IIRIRA attaches new legal
consequences to events completed before its enactment, a judgment
informed and guided by considerations of fair notice, reasonable
reliance, and settled expectations. Landgraf, 511 U. S., at 270. IIRIRAs
elimination of 212(c) relief for people who entered into plea agreements
expecting that they would be eligible for such relief clearly attaches a
new disability to past transactions or considerations. Plea agreements
involve a quid pro quo between a criminal defendant and the government,
and there is little doubt that alien defendants considering whether to
enter into such agreements are acutely aware of their convictions
immigration consequences. The potential for unfairness to people like
St. Cyr is significant and manifest. Now that prosecutors have received
the benefit of plea agreements, facilitated by the aliens belief in
their continued eligibility for 212(c) relief, it would be contrary to
considerations of fair notice, reasonable reliance, and settled
expectations to hold that IIRIRA deprives them of any possibility of
such relief. The INS argument that application of deportation law can
never have retroactive effect because deportation proceedings are
inherently prospective is not particularly helpful in undertaking
Landgrafs analysis, and the fact that deportation is not punishment for
past crimes does not mean that the Court cannot consider an aliens
reasonable reliance on the continued availability of discretionary
relief from deportation when deciding the retroactive effect of
eliminating such relief. That 212(c) relief is discretionary does not
affect the propriety of this Courts conclusion, for there is a clear
difference between facing possible deportation and facing certain
deportation. Pp. 3036. 229 F.3d 406, affirmed.
Stevens, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Kennedy,
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined. OConnor, J., filed a
dissenting opinion. Scalia, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which
Rehnquist, C.J., and Thomas, J., joined, and in which OConnor, J.,
joined, as to Parts I and III.
Posted: Sun - September 28, 2003 at 02:48 PM
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